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Motivation
Software installation: more attractive entry 
point for malware than remote exploits
Provides highest privileges needed to
Plant rootkits/trojans
Hide deep in the system
Contemporary OSes don’t restrict any actions 
performed during installation
Existing techniques for untrusted code security  
have largely ignored the installation phase
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Assumptions and Goals
Basic assumption: Mechanisms available for 
differentiating benign and untrusted software
 Untrusted software: from untrusted sources, may be 
malicious
 Benign software: from well known sources, non-
malicious
Goal: Enable end-to-end life-time defenses 
against untrusted software
 Develop policies and enforcement techniques at 
install/uninstall phases
 Incorporate existing confinement solutions at 
execution phase
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Secure Installation: Requirements
Security: Untrusted software
 should not interfere with benign software
 must always run inside a user-specified sandbox
 should be securely uninstallable at any time
Usability
 Installation or operation of benign software should not 
be restricted in any way
 Almost all (non-malicious) untrusted software should 
install successfully
 Diverse installation mechanisms to be supported
 Software package managers (rpm, dpkg, …)
 Self-installing executables
Tarballs
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Threat Model
Threats in three phases:
 Installation phase
Execution phase
Solutions already exist, e.g., sandboxing
Our goal is to ensure that untrusted code is always 
run within an administrator-specified sandbox
Uninstallation phase
Higher-level goal of malware
Exploit higher level of privilege during 
install/uninstall phases
Execute code outside of sandbox
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Install-time Threats
Attack avenues
Perform malicious actions by running scripts
Modify files used by benign packages
Existing benign packages
Benign packages installed in the future
Embed attacks in its own files
Compromise the integrity of package database
Contents Scripts Requires ConflictsProvides ……
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Uninstall-time Threats
Perform malicious actions
Compromise package database integrity
Remove files belonging to other packages
Leave behind files after uninstallation
Cause errors during uninstall
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Approach Overview
 Initial installation in a 
virtual environment
Policy checking
Commit/abort 
Secure execution 
phase
Secure uninstallation 
phase
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Initial Installation Phase
Need to verify integrity of updates made to 
critical data, e.g., RPM database
Two basic alternatives
Access control policies: eager enforcement, not easy to 
determine safety of each update
Alcatraz, a safe execution environment
 Installation in an isolated environment identical to host OS state
 Permits system to go through unsafe states, as long as the end 
state is “safe”
 State-based policies are strictly more powerful as compared 
to “enforceable policies” 
 Supports commit/abort of results observed within Alcatraz
 Note: Rerunning installation after policy check is unsafe
 Supports diverse installation mechanisms
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Commit/Abort Phase
Policy verification success  commit
Policy verification failure  abort
Commit/Abort functionality is provided by 
Alcatraz
Changes are made to make sure untrusted 
software run inside a user-specified sandbox
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Secure Execution Phase
Works with diverse confinement mechanisms
 Policy-based access control
 Isolated execution
All untrusted files (and execution results) stay within a 
Secure file container (SFC)
 Dynamic information-flow
Label the files belonging to untrusted packages, prevent 
information flow from them into integrity-critical files
SSI creates wrappers for untrusted 
executables/libraries to ensure the use of 
confinement mechanisms
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Policy Checking Phase
Provide higher level policy primitives to ease 
development of application-independent policies
 Can reference package contents and dependencies
 State (and history) based policies
Allow modification of F into F’ such that their diff matches a 
specified regular expression
 Action attribution to provide safe exceptions to policies
Easier to say that ldconfig is safe rather than to define 
permissible changes to ld.so.cache
Rationale similar to that of DTE, but our implementation 
leverages Alcatraz to achieve the same effect without OS-
support for type enforcement
Result: One policy for most untrusted software, 
plus another policy for benign software
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Untrusted Package Installation Policy
No unsafe non-file operations
 Based on Alcatraz policies with a few exceptions
No changes to files belonging to benign apps
 Untrusted installation can only modify/delete files 
belonging to untrusted packages
Protect the integrity of package database
 Modifications must be consistent with the files actually 
copied to the system
 Should not change database entries corresponding to 
other packages
Grant exceptions based on attribution
 ldconfig, …
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Benign Packages Installation Policy
Benign packages should not depend on 
untrusted packages
No policy enforced during uninstallation 
time
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Evaluation
We have implemented SSI 
 On Linux CentOS 4.1
 Based on Alcatraz tool
We have performed installations in SSI
 Malicious packages (~10)
Real-world/crafted, blocked the installations on policy 
violations
 Non-malicious untrusted packages (~100)
 freshrpms/ATrpms, successfully installed
 Benign packages (~40)
CentOs repository, successfully installed
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Defeating Malware Using SSI
Real-world Rootkits
Bobkit, tuxkit, lrk5, portacelo
Modified files belonging to benign packages (ls, 
du,…)
Fake patch from Redhat
Created a privileged user with no passwd
“Malicious” rpm package
Crafted rpm package which overwrote glibc and 
gcc
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Performance Evaluation
SSI Installation Overhead
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Related Work
 Software Installation approaches
 Checkinstall [Eduardo+04]: not for security
 RPMShield [Venkat+02]: not general
 SoftwarePot [Kato+02]: not compatible with existing 
installation methods
 DTE [Boebert+85], SELinux, and Sandboxing
 Appropriate for confining untrusted software during runtime
 Not very convenient during installation
 Every operation needs to be safe
 Difficulty in policy development
 Information flow based approaches to preserve integrity
 PPI [Sun+08], UMIP [Li+07], SLIM [Safford+05]
 Complement with SSI 
 Back to the future [Hsu+06]
 Recovery needed, availability affected 
Stony Brook University 21
Conclusion
Software installation is an attractive vector 
for malware attacks
SSI addresses this problem by securing 
installation process
Work seamlessly with execution confinement 
techniques to “remove gaps in armor” 
Support a diversity of installation mechanisms
Develop high-level policy framework to reduce 
manpower needed for app-specific policies
Evaluation shows our approach is effective and 
practical
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Questions?
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Realizing Safe Installations
Built over Safe Execution Environment (SEE)
 logically isolates outputs of SEE processes from others  
At the end of installation, check conformance to  
state-based policies to ensure safety
 Package database modifications to be consistent with 
state changes observed during installation
 File accesses to be consistent with trust level of package
Untrusted packages can't interfere with benign apps
 Trojans/rootkits prevented from automatically starting up
 Prevent some rootkit-like actions
 e.g., attempt to impersonate a trusted program
Abort installation if policy violated
